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James C. Hathaway
Food Deprivation: A Basis
for Refugee Status?
IT IS COMMONPLACE TO SPEAK OF THOSE IN FLIGHT FROM FAMINE, OR OTHERWISE

migrating in search of food, as “refugees.” Over the past decade alone,
millions of persons have abandoned their homes in countries such
as North Korea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Congo, and Somalia, hoping that
by moving they could find the nourishment needed to survive. In a
colloquial sense, these people are refugees: they are on the move not
by choice, but rather because their own desperation compels them to
pursue a survival strategy away from the desperation confronting their
home communities.
In legal terms, however, refugee status is deﬁned in a signiﬁcantly more constrained way. The key standard, set by the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951,1 as supplemented by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967,2
limits refugee status to a person who

owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country. . . (Convention, supra n.1, at Art. 1([A][2]).
As interpreted, this definition sets five substantive hurdles: departure
from one’s own country; the existence of a forward-looking risk; serious
human rights risk; a causal connection between risk and at least one
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of the five enumerated forms of civil or political status; and failure of
the home state to remedy the threat. There are also clauses that define
when refugee status comes to an end (for example, when protection is
restored in the home state) and when it must not be recognized due to
undeservingness (for example, in the case of international criminals).
As demanding as this Convention refugee deﬁnition clearly is,
there is a logic to its stringency. Any person who meets this deﬁnition
in fact—whether or not she has undergone a formal process of status
assessment—is entitled to arrive without authorization in any of the
nearly 150 countries that are parties to the Convention (Convention,
supra n.1, at Art. 31[1]). Until and unless fairly determined by the host
country not to be a refugee, she cannot be returned directly or indirectly to her home state for the duration of the risk. And perhaps most
important of all, she is entitled to the beneﬁt of a truly extraordinary
catalog of internationally guaranteed rights that enable her to live in
dignity while in exile: civil rights, socioeconomic rights, and rights that
enable pursuit of a solution to her refugeehood (see Hathaway 2005).
In short, while the broad, colloquial deﬁnition of a refugee may
engender empathy or even charity, the narrower legal deﬁnition of a
refugee is a source of entitlement. Whereas a common-sense refugee
pulls at our heartstrings, a Convention refugee is a rights-bearer.
The question addressed here is whether persons in ﬂight from
famine or otherwise migrating in search of food may claim the beneﬁt of this more constrained but dramatically more empowering legal
form of refugee status. Or are they outside that deﬁnition, such that
they must simply hope that others will come to their aid?
The most obvious barrier to Convention refugee status is the
need to have left one’s own country as a condition precedent to refugee status. While the ethicality of this constraint has been debated in
the refugee studies literature,3 its standing in international law is not
open to question. As determined by Lord Justice Simon Brown in the
English Court of Appeal, in the context of the claim by a Roma citizen
of the Czech Republic still in the Prague Airport to be entitled to refugee rights,
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in an ideal world there would no doubt be provision for
states to facilitate the escape of persecuted minorities. . . .
I am satisﬁed, however, that on no view of the 1951 Convention is this within its scope (R. European Roma Rights Centre
and Others v. Immigration Ofﬁcer at Prague Airport, [2003] EWXA
Civ 666 [Eng. CA, May 20, 2003], at paras. 37, 43; approved
in this regard by the House of Lords in R. v. Immigration Ofﬁcer at Prague Airport et al, ex parte Roma Rights Centre et al,
[2004] UKHL 55 [UK HL, Dec. 9, 2004], at paras. 13–17).
So-called internally displaced persons (IDPs) are, of course, entitled
to claim the same general human rights as all persons inside their own
country.4 In Africa, a regional convention moreover expands the scope of
human rights to which IDPs are entitled.5 But the rights set by the Refugee Convention are speciﬁcally designed to counter the disadvantages of
involuntary alienage, not to compensate for involuntary movement as
such. It thus makes sense that refugee rights, conceived as they are to
allow someone forced to live in a foreign country to secure a measure of
enfranchisement in that foreign state, have been limited to such at-risk
persons who are in fact outside their own country.
For those victims of famine or other forms of food deprivation
who do manage to cross a border, there are two main conceptual challenges to securing Convention refugee status. First, is the risk faced
one that is fairly deﬁned as a risk of “being persecuted”? And second,
even if it is a persecutory harm, when can it be said that the risk faced
is “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”?
As classically understood, the 1951 Convention refugee deﬁnition would likely not be terribly sympathetic to the claims of persons
in ﬂight from famine or food deprivation.
First, as the still in force Handbook issued by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1979 suggests, “[t]here
is no universally accepted deﬁnition of ‘persecution,’ and various attempts to formulate such a deﬁnition have met with little success”
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(para. 51).6 States often applied a subjective lens to assess whether a
given risk rose to the level of persecutory harm, and in practice were
more predisposed to accept claims of risk to physical security or basic civil rights than those grounded in threats to socioeconomic wellbeing—a position clearly at odds with recognizing absence of food as
sufﬁcient to establish refugee status.
Second, the “for reasons of” or “nexus” clause was often interpreted by states to require some evidence of particularized intention
on the part of the persecutor grounded in the race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion of the victim.7 This approach set
a very challenging evidentiary hurdle given the unlikelihood of the
persecutor clearly announcing his motives. But at least as important, it
restricted refugee status to those whose intentional victimization could
be ascribed to one of the Convention grounds, thus failing to recognize
refugee status in the case of those who, within a situation of generalized risk such as famine, did not beneﬁt from state protection because
of their race, religion, or other protected ground. In other words, if a
person without food could say “only” that the government had failed
to assist her because she was a member of a minority group or because
she was perceived to be opposed to the government, she would not be
recognized as a refugee under international law.
The good news is that over the course of the past two decades
there has been a major judge-led challenge to many traditional ways
of thinking about the refugee deﬁnition—including both the meaning
of “being persecuted” and the purport of the “for reasons of” clause
(Hathaway 2003). Since there is sadly no single international authority charged with issuing deﬁnitive interpretations of refugee law8—as
there is, for example, under nearly every other UN human rights treaty—it has been left largely to national judges interpreting domestic
laws incorporating the UN refugee deﬁnition to ﬁll the void. These
decisionmakers have often engaged in a “transnational judicial conversation” (Helfer and Slaughter 1997, 371–372) in which they have
sought to update the meaning of the Convention refugee deﬁnition
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in a way that brings some degree of coherence to the international
protection regime as a whole. In a seminal decision, the House of Lords
determined that

the Refugee Convention must be given an independent
meaning. . . without taking color from distinctive features
of the legal system of any individual contracting state. In
principle, there can only be one true interpretation of a
treaty. . . .
In practice it is left to national courts, faced with the material disagreement on an issue of interpretation, to resolve
it. But in doing so, it must search, untrammeled by notions
of its national legal culture, for the true autonomous and
international meaning of the treaty (R. v. Secretary of State, ex
parte Adan, [2001] 2 AC 477 at 516–17).
This search for autonomous and international meaning has led courts
carefully to consider, and often to adopt, the reasoning of their counterparts engaged in refugee status assessment in other jurisdictions. As
recognized by Justice Allsop in a powerful dissenting opinion in the Full
Federal Court of Australia,
[c]onsidered decisions of foreign courts, in particular appellate decisions, should be treated as persuasive in order
to strive for uniformity of interpretation of international
conventions. . . . It is desirable that obligations of the host
states under an instrument such as the [Refugee] Convention be consistently interpreted in order that there be uniformity of approach not only as to host state rights and
obligations, but also as to the derivative legal position of
refugees thereunder (NBGM v. Minister for Immigration [2006]
150 FCR 2006 at para. 158).
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Though this judicial drive to achieve principled, common ground was
traditionally most advanced in states of the common law (English lawbased) tradition, the civil law states of the European Union are now
increasingly looking to common, international standards as well (see
Lambert 2009). And while the United States remains the least engaged of
common law countries on this front, both administrative guidelines and
some judicial decisions have now championed a common, internationalist approach to understanding the Convention refugee definition (see
Anker 2011, 176).
This judicial renovation of refugee law has opened the doors to a
more principled and thoughtful understanding of refugee law in ways
that have direct relevance to the claims of those in ﬂight from famine
or other forms of food deprivation. First, there is now general agreement that core norms of international human rights law—the body
of law designed by states to deﬁne impermissible harms—should be
the principled point of reference for understanding how to identify a
risk of being persecuted. Pioneered by courts in Canada and the United
Kingdom (see in particular Ward v. Canada: [1993] 2 SCR 689 at 733; and
Horvath v. Secretary of State [2001] 1 AC 489 at 495), the link between human rights law and persecutory harm in refugee law is now formally
binding on all states of the European Union as well (Council Directive
2011/95/EU, OJ L 337/9 [“Qualiﬁcation Directive”], at Art. 9). While less
well developed in the United States, even there a leading court determined that “[w]hether the treatment feared by a claimant violates recognized standards of basic human rights can determine whether persecution exists” (Stenaj v. Gonzalez [2007] 227 F.3d 429 at paras. 12–14; see
also Abay v. Ashcroft [2008] 368 F.3d 634 at 638–639). A similar position
is taken in US guidelines on the adjudication of gender-speciﬁc claims
to refugee status (Department of Homeland Security 2009, 21).
In implementing this link between “being persecuted” and international human rights law, refugee law has increasingly taken on
board the view that all human rights are properly understood to be
equal and indivisible (Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 [June 12, 1993], at para. 5; this declaration was
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endorsed by 171 states). Speciﬁcally, it is not the case that a risk to civil
and political rights can be said to be “serious harm,” but a risk to socioeconomic rights—also codiﬁed in international law, and of equal legal
authority—cannot. Thus, interpretation of “serious harm” for refugee
law purposes should take account of risks to, inter alia, the internationally guaranteed right to food, a critical aspect of the right to an
adequate standard of living set by the Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions (International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), adopted December 16,
1966; entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, henceforth “Economic
Covenant,” at Art. 11) [emphasis added].
To be clear, the existence of this right does not mean that every
person departing his country in search of food is a refugee. For example, a US court sensibly determined that a Salvadoran denied access
to the government’s discounted food regime did not face the risk of a
persecutory harm: while the situation reduced his food options, those
limits did not rise to the level of gravity required to be persecution (Saballo Cortez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service [1984] 761 F.2d 1259
at 1264). On the other hand, it has been recognized that “denial of famine relief in anti-government areas” may constitute persecution (Chan
v. Canada [1992] 42 ACWS 3d 259); that the “taking of harvests of those
perceived as ‘enemies,’ rather than those perceived as allies” might
found a claim to be at risk of persecution (Hagi-Mohammed v. Minister
for Immigration [2001] FCA 1156 at para. 7); and that “discriminatory
exclusion from access to food is capable itself of constituting persecution” (RN [Returnees] Zimbabwe CG, UKAIT 00083 [2008] UKAIT 00083 at
para. 249). In the latter decision, which took up the issue of the use of
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food as a weapon, the United Kingdom’s Immigration Appeal Tribunal
recognized refugee status on the grounds that

the government of Zimbabwe has used its control of the distribution of food aid as a political tool to the disadvantage of
those thought to be potential supporters of the MDC. This
discriminatory deprivation of food to perceived opponents,
taken together with the disruption of the efforts of NGOs
to distribute food by means of the ban introduced in June
2008, amounts to persecution of those deprived of access to
this essential support (para. 250).
Even in the United States, there is clear evidence of an openness to recognizing food-based persecution, with the Board of Immigration Appeals
having determined that an applicant
need not demonstrate a total deprivation of livelihood or
a total withdrawal of all economic opportunity in order
to demonstrate harm amounting to persecution. . . . Government sanctions that reduce an applicant to an impoverished existence may amount to persecution even if the
victim retains the ability to afford the bare essentials of life
(In re TZ (2007) 251 I&N Dec. 163 at 172–3).
Assuming, then, that food deprivation will, at least in extreme cases,
be sufficiently serious to qualify as a form of persecution, what of the
second relevant challenge—showing that the risk is “for reasons of”
one of the five Convention grounds? This is, of course, most commonly
a concern where famine or food deprivation seems to be a generalized
problem in the place of origin. The problem here has traditionally been
the view—sadly still generally taken in the United States—that there
must be a nexus between a Convention ground and the intentions of the
persecutor —in other words, did the person or organization want to starve
the applicant because she is black, a woman, a political opponent? Absent
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evidence of such narrowly framed persecutory intent, a refugee claim
assessed under this rubric would fail.
Yet here too there has been quite extraordinary progress in at
least some jurisdictions. Building on the judicial recognition that the
causal connection required by international law is not actually to “persecution” (understood as the direct act) but rather to “being persecuted” (that is, the predicament of being at risk) (Minister for Immigration v.
Kord [2002] 125 FCR 68 at para. 2; see also Minister for Immigration v. Khawar [2002] 210 CLR 1 at para. 108), courts have increasingly determined
that the nexus requirement can be satisﬁed in either of two ways. First,
the nexus requirement is met in the classical situation in which the
persecutor is indeed motivated to harm by a Convention factor—clearly that intention, based for example on nationality or religion, explains
why the applicant is in trouble (see text supra, at fn.7). But modern jurisprudence recognizes that this is not the only way such a connection
could be established. Even if the risk of food deprivation is itself generalized, some people might nonetheless be at risk for a Convention
reason if the state fails to protect her (individually, or as part of a group)
for a Convention reason (see, for example, Horvath v. Secretary of State
[2001] 1 AC 489 at 497–8). In other words, a person from whom protection is withheld for a Convention reason is as much in the predicament
of “being persecuted” for a Convention reason as is the person initially
targeted for harm for a Convention reason.
The logic of this position was eloquently explained in a seminal
decision of the House of Lords:

[S]uppose the Nazi government . . . did not actively organize
violence against Jews, but pursued a policy of not giving
any protection to Jews subjected to violence by neighbors.
A Jewish shopkeeper is attacked by a gang organized by an
Aryan competitor. . . . The competitor and his gang are motivated by business rivalry and the desire to settle old personal scores. . . .
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Is he being persecuted on ground of race? . . . [I]n my opinion, he is. An essential element in the persecution, the failure by the authorities to provide protection, is based upon
race. It is true that one answer to the question “why was he
attacked?” would be “because a competitor wanted to drive
him out of business.” But another answer, and in my view
the right answer in the context of the Convention, would
be “he was attacked by a competitor who knew he would
receive no protection because he was a Jew” (R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 at 653–4).
This evolution in thinking about the “for reasons of” requirement is important for those ﬂeeing food deprivation. There will, of
course, be cases like the Zimbabwean situation noted above, in which
a government seeks to punish perceived opponents by means of a targeted policy of food deprivation. But perhaps more commonly, there
will be cases in which there is no evidence of an active, discriminatory
intention to withhold food, but rather only of a government’s failure to
respond to generalized famine or other food deprivation on a nondiscriminatory basis. While such cases would fall outside the classical approach to the nexus clause—after all, the risk of starvation arose from
generalized, not discriminatory, causes—the bifurcated approach provides a second means to satisfy this requirement by recognizing that a
discriminatory failure to remedy a risk is equally the basis for refugee
status. Because the link to a “failure” of state protection is all that
must be shown under the bifurcated approach, it is sufﬁcient to show
that the government simply could not be bothered to protect a portion
of the at-risk group—reasoning, for example, that because they are
“only” women or indigenous persons they were not worthy of an expenditure of government resources. In such circumstances, the failure
of protection is causally connected to a Convention ground and refugee
status should be recognized.
These critical developments—the anchoring of “being persecuted” analysis in international human rights law, including socio-
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economic rights such as the right to food; and the broadening of our
understanding of the “for reasons of” clause to include not only those
targeted for a Convention ground, but also those failed by their state
for such a reason—do not, of course, mean that all victims of famine or
food deprivation able to cross an international border are Convention
refugees. There will still be cases where the nature of the food deprivation cannot honestly be said to infringe the right to an adequate standard of living, thus falling outside the scope of “serious harm” relevant
to a ﬁnding that a risk rises to the level of “being persecuted.” And
even more commonly, there will be situations in which there is not
only no intention to deprive a person of food for a Convention reason,
but where not even the failure of the home state to respond to that risk
can be seen as discriminatory. While the African regional norm may
provide access to refugee status in even such cases,9 it remains the case
that the international refugee deﬁnition binding on most states will
not require recognition of refugee status.
But contemporary understandings of refugee status nonetheless
enfranchise a not insigniﬁcant number of persons compelled to ﬂight
across a border by reason of food scarcity. There is today a solid basis to
claim Convention refugee status at least where serious denial of food
results from using food as a weapon or otherwise actively seeking to
punish or harm people—for example, because of their race or religion;
as well as where a generalized and serious insufﬁciency of food is met
with a discriminatory response by the state based on, for example, sex
or political views. With Convention status comes Convention rights,
and with Convention rights comes the empowerment to rebuild one’s
life in security, and with dignity.
NOTES

1. Adopted July 28, 1951, entered into force April 22, 1954, UNTS 137
(“Refugee Convention” or “Convention”).
2. Adopted January 31, 1967, entered into force October 4, 1967, 606
UNTS 267 (referred to herein as “Refugee Protocol” or “Protocol”).
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3. See in particular the Symposium in the 2007 Journal of Refugee Studies
(20: 349 ff.), containing responses by Roberta Cohen, Howard Adelman/
Susan McGrath, and Josh DeWind to J. Hathaway, “Forced Migration
Studies: Could We Agree Just to ‘Date’?”
4. See United Nations “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,”
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, Feb. 11, 1998.
5. African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, adopted October 26, 2009,
entered into force December 6, 2012. Regrettably, the treaty provides
little by way of meaningful enforcement of the obligations formally
assumed.
6. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (UN
Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.3; henceforth Handbook); reissued in 2011.
7. In the United States, the leading precedent of Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Elias Zacarias (1992) 502 US 478 (USSC, Jan. 22,
1992) takes this position. See also Ram v. Minister of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs (1995) 30 ALR 213 (Aus. FFC, June 9, 2000 at 12), reflecting
the traditional (though since discredited) Australian approach.
8. States are required to “cooperate” with UNHCR in its institutional role
of “supervising the application” of the Convention: Convention, supra
n.1, at Art. 35. The agency, however, has no authority to mandate any
particular interpretation of the Convention refugee definition. See
Hathaway (2013).
9. The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa, UNTS 14691, entered into force June 20, 1974, at Art. 1(2),
which extends refugee status to inter alia persons forced to f lee all
or part of their country of origin due to “events seriously disturbing
public order,” and which leaves open the possibility that the reason
for the risk faced may be indeterminate.
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